Runtime Security on @Unc1e

Agents Can Now Take Action—Security Can't Stay in the Conversation: Runtime Design at the Action Boundary

Sun, 02 Aug 2026 10:50:39 +0800

Lately I’ve been doing more and more AI red teaming: half the time thinking about how to attack Agents, and the other half thinking about:

once the attacks are done, what should real-world defense actually look like?

I’ve written a local-first Agent Runtime Guard (ARG) myself, and I’ve also taken apart Microsoft’s newly open-sourced Agent Governance Toolkit (AGT). After taking both apart, the conclusion is actually quite clear:

Agent runtime protection is, in essence, the “firewall” of the LLM era. Whenever I mention “firewall”—a word that has been beaten to death—I want to laugh. Still, this is decidedly not another layer of prompt rhetoric, nor is it old IAM renamed. What it intercepts is the segment where “the model’s intent has already formed, but the side effects haven’t happened yet”—the command hasn’t been exec’d, the keys haven’t been read, the email hasn’t been sent, no HTTP has left the network.

[SOC] Traffic Protection Effectiveness: How to Verify Whether Your Internal Network IDS Is Working Properly

Mon, 16 Sep 2024 23:16:22 +0800

::::info http://www.testmyids.com/

::::

To determine whether an internal network intrusion detection system (IDS) is running properly and effectively detecting potential threats in network traffic, you can take a hands-on approach to verify its functionality. A well-known resource frequently used for this kind of testing is

http://www.testmyids.com/

This website is designed for security professionals, aiming to help them assess whether their IDS can accurately identify and raise alerts on potentially malicious activity or non-compliant network requests.

[SOC] Defending Against Apereo CAS Deserialization Attacks with Suricata

Tue, 08 Aug 2023 19:33:47 +0800

1. Attack Characteristics of the Vulnerability

The root cause of this vulnerability is the deserialization of untrusted user input, which involves a hardcoded key.

An attacker can leverage deserialization gadgets already present on the target machine to perform malicious operations.

The traffic characteristics of normal versus malicious requests are described below.

A normal login request.

Request

execution length: 1121

Response

Status code: 200

Response length: 7287

Malicious exploitation - no response echo

Request